Aesthetics has long been tied
to the ideas of beauty, and the relationship of the two has been discussed
since antiquity, even before aesthetics was recognized as a discipline in the
seventeenth century. While beauty is not
the intended focus of Moses Mendelssohn’s essay “On the sublime and naïve in
the fine sciences,” it is not surprising to find that beauty has a substantial
role in this work on aesthetic experience.
This essay was published in 1758, a short time after Johann J. Winckelmann’s
“Reflections on the Imitation of Greek Works in Painting and Sculpture,” in
1755. It is unclear whether Mendelssohn
considered Winckelmann’s essay in the formulation of his own. It may be wrong to presume that Mendelssohn
was directly motivated or inspired by Winckelmann’s thought; nonetheless the
two texts share many similarities. The most striking similarity is in their
theories is the emphasis on the representation of the beauty of the soul. Both philosophers place great importance on
the role of this immaterial and non-sensory thing. This emphasis is peculiar
considering that the discipline of aesthetics appears to be hinged on that
which can be sensed,[1]
i.e. the material. This paper explicates Mendelssohn’s ideas on
the sublime and the naïve in representations, and argue that his consideration
of these two are driven by and rests upon the concept of the beauty of the
soul. Furthermore, the paper will show
that many of Mendelssohn’s thoughts were in common with Winckelmann’s. This
parallel suggests that Mendelssohn and his ideas were well-supported by the
aesthetic and art history scholarship of his time.
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| Apollo Belvedere |
The concept of beauty of
the soul features so prominently in Mendelssohn’s “On the sublime,” that it
could be said to be the motivating factor behind his formulations of the notions
of both the sublime and the naïve in the ‘fine sciences’[2]. In his treatment of the sublime, Mendelssohn separates
representations of the sublime into two categories. For both the admirable object and the
admirable representation, the property that makes the representation sublime is
the proper presentation of beauty of the soul.
The first, the admirable object, is sublime insomuch as the object which
is represented “possesses awesome properties in and for itself, in which case
the awe at the object becomes the dominating idea.”[3]
In this case, one is most impressed by the “genius and extraordinary
capabilities of the artist[4].”[5]
Mendelssohn argues that the
representation of the admirable object calls for a noble simplicity, as the
greatness of the object itself would only be obscured by ornamental
representations. For, “a great soul
expresses its sensibilities uprightly and emphatically, but not bombastically,”[6]
The role of the artist is simply to bring the admirable properties of the
object into light. Mendelssohn and
Winckelmann have a clear consensus on the importance of quiet grandeur. Winckelmann
noted that “quiet grandeur both in posture and expression” is both desirable,
so that the “expression of the figures… reveal a great and composed soul even
in the midst of passion.”[7]
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| Raft of the Medusa, Theodore Gericault |
In the second type of sublimity
in representations, the representation that is admirable, and the object itself
which is represented is not responsible for sublimity; in fact, the object is
irrelevant. While it is true that the
object itself is not admirable, certain objects are inclined towards or share
similarities with the sublime without being sublime itself. “By their very nature [certain objects] are
frightening and dreadful, and support the sentiment of the sublime because of
the sensuous immensity inherent in them.
For this reason artists also prefer to select them.”[8] But not
all admirable representations are of objects which supplement the sublime, and
in fact some “objects [are] of a completely indifferent nature.”[9]
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| Banana, Andy Warhol |
Given the unimportance of the object
represented, the emphasis is on how. “It
is left completely up to the artist’s powers as to how sublime these objects appear
to us, … [and] to what extent they would deserve our awe and admiration.”[10] Mendelssohn proposes that the admirable
representation is sublime “insofar as each work is also a copy of the
perfection of its creator,” and thus the work is a “reference to the spiritual
gifts of the artist which make themselves visibly known.”[11] Winckelmann too argues for the importance of
the artist’s genius. He speaks of the
artist Raphael as having “so great a soul in so handsome a body,” which, to
Winckelmann, was a necessary quality an artist needs to possess in order to
grasp the noble characteristics of Greek works.
So beauty of the soul concerns the admirable representation as well, though
in a less direct manner in comparison with the admirable object. It is the soul of the artist that is revealed
through the manifestation of his talents, and not because of any one object
which is represented.
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| The Proposition, Judith Leyster |
In Mendelssohn’s notion of
the naïve in representations, the driving power of the beauty of the soul for
this concept is even more evident.
Unlike the sublime, the naïve is not divided into admirable object and
admirable representation. There is only
one type of naïve, and it appears to serve or compliment the sublime to some
extent. While discussing the sublime,
Mendelssohn argues that “in representing something sublime of this type [the
admirable object], the artist must devote himself to a naïve, unaffected
expression which allows the reader… to think more than is said to him.”[12] It seems that representations of the naïve
are more aligned with the admirable object, in that the object itself has some
great quality, and it is the job of the artist to reveal it. Though the object, unlike the admirable
object, is not itself sublime, but one is captivated by how the simplicity of
the appearance reveals an inner beauty of the soul. The naïve is similar to the
sublime in that it astonishes. Mendelssohn
speaks of the naïve as a mask of simplicity, under which there “must lie a
beautiful thought, an important truth, a noble sentiment.”[13]
For this reason, representations of the sublime have a character of naivety, in
that the beauty of the soul will shine through the simplicity. Mendelssohn cites specific examples that
illustrate the naïve appearance, such as a “childlike face” and a “gentleness
of countenance” – all in all there is “something unsophisticated in the outer
appearance that unintentionally betrays an inner splendidness.”[14]
Winckelmann, while not using the term naïve, uses the same vocabulary as
Mendelssohn to describe Raphael’s Sistine
Madonna[15]
with phrases such as “gentle charm of expression” and “innocence of childhood.”[16] These outward characteristics of naivety enhances
the astonishment one has when the inner beauty of the soul is revealed.
The concept of the
beautiful soul is central to Mendelssohn’s argument for representations of both
types of the sublime as well as the naïve.
In each, the artist is responsible for creating a work that reveals the
beauty of the soul through outward characteristics. Mendelssohn is not alone in emphasizing the
importance of the beautiful soul in the fine sciences, as Winckelmann also
stressed that the proper representation of an admirable soul is a necessary
component in great works. Thus, it is
clear that the best aesthetic works are not only beautifully represented, but
also possess a depth of beauty beyond appearances.
[1] If one were to take the etymology of the word ‘aesthetics’
literally, from the Greek aisthetikos
meaning to apprehend or perceive by the senses.
[2] One can conclude from the examples given in this essay, drawn from
the fields of art, poetry, and music that Mendelssohn intended to include a
variety of fields in the category of the fine sciences. In a different work,
“On the main principles of the fine arts and sciences,” a division is drawn
between the fine arts and the fine sciences, and each is categorized based on
their tendency towards either natural or arbitrary signs respectively. There, poetry and rhetoric alone are in the
category of the fine sciences, whereas the separate group of the fine arts
includes painting, music, and so on.
However, in “On the sublime,” this division is unclear, and the concepts
of the sublime and naïve are not presented as having different impacts between
the fields of the fine sciences and arts.
[3] Mendelssohn, Moses. "On the sublime and naive in the fine
sciences." In Philosophical Writings, edited by Daniel O. Dahlstrom, 196.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
[4] Though ‘artist’ is
often used for fine artists (i.e. not for musicians, poets, etc.) Mendelssohn uses
it broadly to indicate any creator in the fine sciences; this paper will follow
his example.
[7] Johann Joachim Winckelmann. "Reflections on the Imitation of
Greek Works in Painting and Sculpture." In The Art of Art History, edited
by Donald Preziosi, 30. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
[15] Winckelmann simply describes it as “Madonna
and Child with St. Sixtus and St. Barbara,” and all indications from the text
(33) point to it being the Sistine
Madonna.
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